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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ELDON L. ANDERSON, dba
SILVER DOLLAR LOUNGE,
Appellant,
vs.

Case No. l5653

UTAH COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, YUKUS Y.
INOUYE, KARL R. LYMAN,
and VERL D. STONE, as
Comn1i s s ione rs,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Appellant initiated this action in the Fourth District Court in
and for Utah County, State of Utah, praying for an Extraordinary Writ to
review and reverse the ruling by the Board of County Commissioners of
Utah County which denied the appellant a business license.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Fourth District Court, in and for Utah County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge presiding, entered its Order
dismissing the plaintiff/appellant's complaint, no cause of action,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

apparently on the basis that the Utah County Commission has the absolu
authority to revoke or deny a Class B Beer license without cause.

>Jo

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were made by the Court.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the District Court's dec1s 10 n a:,:

a finding that the Utah County Commission's denial of a lie ens e was arb:·: 1
and capricious.

Appellant seeks an order requiring the issuance of a U2

B Beer license; and in the event this Court upholds the lower Court's
decision, a restraining order pending the final determination of plaintiff/
appellant's second cause of action, pending in the lower Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action wherein the plaintiff/appellant had filed on1·
about December 15, 1975, an application for a Class B Beer license wiu,
Utah County.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit #1, R-50)

The Stipulated Facts contaP"

in plaintiff's memorandum erroneously lists the filing date as July l, 1'1; '
(R-8)

After complaints filed against lhe appellant by the Sheriffs
Office were dismissed by the Courts, the Utah County She riff

i

efus cd to

"becaus•
recommend approval of appellant's application on June 23 , 19 76 '

of numerous complaints of fighting, other disturbances and violations."
(Appellant's Exhibit #1, R-50)

These actions on the Sheriff's part foilc.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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!

the appellant's successful challenge of the Sunday closing law in Utah
County in the Provo City Court, Case No. 20304.
R-9)

(Appellant's Exhibit

By refusing to recommend approval of the appellant's license the

Sheriff was proceeding under Section 7-6-2 of the Uta_h
_ .c oun t y

o r d.inances

wherein the following language is found:
"The commission may revoke any beer license upon
recommendation of the Sheriff or the County Attorney
when it appears to their satisfaction that any licensed
premises has become a f1_~ as defined by County
Ordinances .... "
No specific charges were ever filed against the appellant by
the Utah County Attorney or the Sheriff regarding the premises being a
"nuisance", and there have been no convictions for any violations of law.
Two hearings v.:ere held by the Utah County Commission, on
August 16, 1976, and on September 27, 1976, and the appellant was ordered
to show cause why his license should be renewed.

The Commission denied

the license renewal; and as a part of its findings, relied upon the fact that
the appellant had plead guilty to a felony twenty-two (22) years earlier.
Further, numerous fights and public disturbances allegedly occurred and
minors were sold beer.
at R-52)

(Page 2 of Findings and Decision of Commission

The Fourth District Court dismissed the charges of selling beer

Lo minors because of the Sheriff's officer's wrongful conduct.

(R-10)

Appellant filed an appeal with the Fourth District Court, Utah
County, alleging that the Commission's denial was arbitrary and capricious
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
3
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(First Cause of Action) and that the Utah County Commission and the Ut,
County Sheriff's Office conspired to deprive the appellant of his consti't: ,
rights in violation of Title 42 of the United States Code, Sections 1983 tr..
1985 (Second Cause of Action).

By stipulation of counsel the Court issuec.

temporary restraining order enjoining Utah County or its employees fror
interfering with the appellant's ope ration of the Silver Dollar Lounge un•
the matter could be decided on its merits.
The Second Cause of Action is presently pending before the
Fourth District Court, and this appeal was necessitated by the fact that
the District Court dissolved its restraining order by its ruling dated
January 30, 1978.

Further, the Court made no findings of fact on the ,s;·

of whether or not the Commission's decision was arbitrary and capricio'-'I
and held that the appellant's complaint should be dismissed, no cause ol
action.

It is from this decision that this appeal is taken.

Finally, the Stipulated Facts contained in the appellants
Memorandum of Authorities (R-8, 9 and 10) were orally stipulated to by
the Utah County Attorney and should be made a part of this Statement 01
Facts. (R-51, pages 4 and 5)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THAT THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO ISSUE

4
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PROPER FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW TO SUPPORT
ITS DECISION WAS ERROR.

On or about the 30th day of January, 1978, the Fourth District
Court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

The Court's

findings consist of a review of its procedural actions in arriving at a conclusion.

Nowhere therein does the Court set forth an analysis of the

material factual differences between the parties, nor does it establish any
type of ultimate factual basis to support its decision to dismiss appellant's
first cause of action and to dissolve appellant's preliminary injunction.
Both the findings and conclusions are inadequate as neither
purport to fulfill the purpose for which they were designed.
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, "Effect.

Rule 52 (a)

In all actions tried

upon the facts without a jury ... , the Court shall find the facts specially
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon ....

11

The following case law supports and explains the foregoing:
"Findings of Fact" may be defined as the written statement
of the ultimate facts as found by the Court, signed by the Court, and filed
therein, and essential to support a decision and judgment rendered therein.
In re Good's Estate, 266 P2d 719, 729, 175 Kan.

576.

·
of Law" are not ministerial
"Findings of Fact" and "Cone l us ions
duties, but are fruits of judicial ascertainment.

Allen v. U.S. ' DC Tex.'

5
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10 P2d 807, 809.
Statements in a trial Court's memorandum regarding its,.,,,
concerning the evidence were not "findings of fact."

Ferderer v, Nori[,,,

Pac. Ry. Co., 26 N. W. 2d 236, 244, 75 N. D. 139.
The office of the "Findings of Fact" is to distill from the,,,.
dence addressed at trial of a disputed issue the pertinent facts which m.
be known by the court in order to enable it to determine and apply the
relevant rules of law and thereupon to grant appropriate relief to the
litigants.

Hartford-Empire Co. v. Shawkee Mfg. Co., c. ca. Pa., [i;

F2d 532, 535.
In an early Utah case the Court stated, "It is the duty of the
trial court to find upon all material issue raised by the pleadings, and
failure to do so is reversible error."

Baker v. Hatch, 70 Ut. 1, 257

P673, at 676.
This decision was followed by Sandall v. Hoskins,

104 Ut.'

137 P2d 819, 822, which was a case to determine whether lessees were
entitled to grazing rights in leased land.

The Court stated at page 822'

'"Findings of Fact' means ultimate facts which are
conclusions of fact or deductions to be made from
one or more basic or evidentiary facts to arrive al
the final facts although the stepping stone facts in
between may require the application of legal propositions to resolve them, and what should be contained
in the findings of fact are those facts on each issue
which are necessary to make flow from then1 a Law
conclusion or to make such law conclusions intelligible.''

6
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Gaddis Investment v. Morrison, 3 Ut. 2d 43, 278 P2d 284,
reaffirmed the principle announced in Baker.

This was a contract action

by a real estate broker for his commission; the defendant raised the issue
of abandonment of the contract by his answer, and the trial court failed
to make findings of fact concerning this issue.

Failure of the trial court

to make findings of fact on all material issues was said to be reversible
error where it is prejudicial.
And in LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, 18 Ut. 2d 260,
420 P2d 615, which was a suit to enforce an alleged agreement to convey
interest in certain mining property and to recover money advanced to
defendant where the trial court failed to make findings of fact, lhis Court
said at page 616:
"The right to ~esort to the Courts for the adjudication
of grievances and the settlement of disputes is fundamental. .. an indisposable requisite to fulfilling that
responsibility is the determinations of questions of
fact when there is disagreement. It is for this reason
that our rules ... impose ... the duty of making findings
on all male rial is sues."
The Alaska State Supreme Court has said:
"It is the duty of a trial court to deal adequately with
and state with clarity what it finds as facts and what
it holds as conclusions of law. The findings and
conclusions should be so explicit as to give this Court
a clear understanding of the basis for the decision
made." (Dickerson v. Geiermann, 368 P2d 217 (1962)

at 219.)

7
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In the instant case, the appellant has not been provided cithn
a reason or an understanding as to the basis of the trial court's dc-cision,
This is most perplexing to the appellant because appellant was directed
through his counsel to research and submit to the Court a memorandum
concerning the authority, if any, of the Utah County Commission to deny
the appellant's renewal application without stating or determining cause,
This task was accomplished and to the best of the appellant's knowledgP
no counter memorandum was filed by the respondents.
However, neither the findings of fact or conclusions of law
address any of the points presented to the Court by the appellant; and he
is totally without knowledge, either in fact or law, as to the reason for
the denial of his renewal application.

POINT 11
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE UTAH COUNTY COMMISSION'S FAILURE TO RENEW APPELLANT
CLASS B BEER LICENSE WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.

There is little question that the issuance or renewal of the
liquor license itself ordinarily rests in the studied discretion of the bod\
which has been delegated such power.

However, there does exist a

question as to the proper exercise of such discretion; for while it is broac
it cannot be applied arbitrarily or capriciously.

8
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"The intentment of the law is that the discretionary
decision shall be the outcome of examination and
consideration, and not a mere expression of personal
will, and the refusal of licensing authorities to issue
a license without having made due inquiry into the
relevant facts and without having stated its reason for
such refusal is arbitrary •... " (45 Am Jur 2d 603
"Intoxicating Liquors", Sec. 161)
'
Renewal of a license is a matter of the state authority's
discretion after a consideration of all factors, including prior conduct of the
licensed premises, which could properly be considered in issuing a license.
Fernandez v. State Liquor Authority, 122 NYS 2d 592, ll5 NE 2nd 829.
Normally,

a permit to carry on a liquor business is renewable

or revocable in the manner provided by statute.

48 Corpus Juris

Secundum 277, "Intoxicating Liquors" Chapter 6, Section 7-6-1, of the
Utah County Ordinances vests in the County Commission the power to
revoke licenses " ... for any violation of this ordinance or any other
ordinance or law or for any other good cause.

11

(Emphasis added) Section

2 specifies that the Commission may revoke a license when in its opinion
such action is necessary for the protection of public helath, peace or morals.
On its face, the cited chapter mandates that cause need be established and
considered by the licensing body in determining whether or not a license shall
issue.

While wide discretion may be given in the exercise of that discre-

tion, it must be governed by a proper consideration of the facts and
circumstances of each applicant.

The right to refuse for cause of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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necessity vests in the Commission the duty to determine what is· good
for refusal.

CJ"

"A revocation for 'cause' generally must be based on a

violation of the liquor law or of regulations promulgated thereunder." 48
Corpus Juris Secundum 282 , "Intoxicating Liquors"

A lack of such

determination a bus es the Commission's discretionary power and makes

1·•

action arbitrary and capricious.
"Capricious or arbitrary exercise of discretion by an
administrative board can arise in only three ways,
namely: (a) By neglecting or refusing lo use reasonable diligence and care to procure such evidence as it
is by law authorized to consider in exercising the
discretion vested in it; (b) By failing to give candid
and honest consideration of the evidence before it on
which it is authorized to act in exercising its discretion; (c) By exercising its discretion in such a
manner after a consideration of evidence before it as
clearly to indicate that its action is based on conclusions from the evidence such that reasonable men
fairly and honestly considering the evidence must
reach contrary conclusions." (Van De Vegt v. Board
of Com' rs of Larimer County, 55 P2d 705, Colo. 1936)
While the liquor authorities need not follow the precise rules
of evidence and procedure required to be followed by judicial officers,
they can annul or suspend a license only on competent proof. Migliacc~
O'Connell, 307 NY 566, 122 NE 2d 914.
Refusal by the Commission to issue a license without havin.c
made due inquiry into the relevant facts and without stating its reasons·
such refusal would be arbitrary and not the exercise of legal discretion.

10
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Under such circumstances, an applicant might be entitled to invoke the
extraordinary remedy of mandamus.

The United States ex rel Roop v.

Douglas, 19 D.C. 99.
This inquiry should consist of the taking and examining of
evidence.

The right to revoke or suspend a liquor permit as a general

rule depends on the evidence presented.

The burden is on the board or

officer to prove the facts which constitute the causes which are alleged as
grounds for revocation or suspension.

Cambell v. Galena Chemical Co.,

N. Y. 50 S. Ct. 412, 281 US 599, 74 L Ed 1063.

In the case before the

Court no specific charge was ever made against the appellant.

When this

license renewal application was denied without a hearing, the burden was
placed upon the appellant to prove that he was operating lawfully.

As to the

weight and sufficiency of such evidence, general rules of evidence apply as
lo whether it is sufficient to prove particular facts or violations.
Distilleries v. Alexander,

C. C. A., 109 F2d 397.

Arrow

Although evidence

beyond a reasonable doubt or overwhelming proof is not required, there
must be substantial evidence of probative character to sustain the action
of the deciding body.

It has been held that revocation cannot be based upon

evidence which causes a mere suspicion of a violation of a liquor statute.
Mahanoy Mfg. Co. v. Doran, D. C. Pa. 40 F2d 561.

This Court went on

lo say at page 561, "The real question is not so much over the facts as
over the other question of whether the truth of the charge was brought home
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
11 OCR, may contain errors.
Machine-generated

to the perrnitee with that degree of certainty which would juslify a revocation of Lhe permit."
There is no question that where a licensing board conducts a
proper hearing and assigns a valid reason for refusing to grant a license
the courts, in the absence of a showing that the action of the board was a
abuse of its plain legal duty in the premises, will not assume there waso
lack of substantial reason for such action.

However, appellant contends

that such was not the case here.
In O' Conner v. City of Moscow, 202 P2d 401, Idaho 1949, a
case involving a question as to whether or not a city ordinance deeming
change of ownership of an existing business in which draft beer or liquor
by the drink was sold to be a new or additional business and thus prohibit!
from operating within specified areas, the Idaho Court, at page 405, sta'd'
"While a license to operate a beer parlor ... does not
confer any vested property right, yet if the city makes
such businesses lawful by a permit or license, it cannot arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably impair,
interfere with or eradicate the same. 11
On page 67, 51 Arn Jur 2d, "License and Permits", Sec 62
it is said:

"The weight to be given to evidence presented in a
hearing in which it is sought to suspend or revoke a
license rests ... in the discretion of. .. body ... conducting the hearing. However, it has been said that
hearsay evidence, standing alone, is not sufficient
to support the suspension or revocation of a license
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where the licensee is entitled to a hearing on the
matter involved." (Emphasis added)
In lhe instant matter, the Commission considered no hard
evidence but relied upon a simple written statement of the County Sheriff
upon the appellant's application to the effect that the Silver Dollar Lounge
was involved in" ... numerous complaints of fighting, other disturbances
and violations."

These allegations have never been supported by evidence

from the Sheriff's Office, and the appellant maintains that they are unfounded
and a re in effect hearsay allegations.
Revocation of a license for cause has been said to contemplate
such cause as would render the licensee unfit to engage in the licensed
activity with his fitness being judged in the light of the potential evil with
which the legislature was· concerned in enacting the licensing legislation.
As heretofore stated, the ordinance herein involved is Chapter
6, "Revocation of Licenses'', Sections 7-6-1 and 7-6-2, which are set forth
as follows:
"7-6-1. Revocation After Notice and Hearing
Any license issued under this Title may be revoked
after notice to and hearing for the licensee, unless
otherwise specifically provided for herein or in any
other ordinance. After notice of and hearing concerning the revocation of a license, the Commission
may revoke the license of any licensee for any
violation of this ordinance or any other ordinance
or law or for any other cause which the Commission
deems good and sufficient.

13
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7-6-2. Revocation of Beer Licenses
The Commission may with or without hearing at its
discretion, refuse to grant any beer license applied
for and may revoke any license at any time, when
in its opinion it is necessary for the protection of
public health, peace or morals, and in no such
case need any cause be given, if any applicant or
licensee shall not possess or shall cease to possess
all of the qualifications required by the Liquor
Control Act of Utah, or fails to comply with the
ordinances of the County. It shall be unlawful for
any person to engage in the sale of beer after
revocation of his license until he may again qualify
as provided herein to engage in the sale thereof.
The Commission may revoke any beer license upon
recommendation of the Sheriff or the County Attorney,
when it appears to their satisfaction that any licensed
premise has become a nuisance as defined by County
Ordinances, or a disorderly house, and in any case
where the license is so revoked no license shall again
be issued for such premises for a period of six
months after revocation. 11
The ordinance, on its face, requires notice and a hearing ano

places a burden upon the County Commission to consider certain standard',
i.e., establish cause, before revoking a license, to-wit:

1.

Protection of public health, peace or morals;

2.

Lack of qualifications required by the Liquor Control Act.

These standards are to be met as determined by the "opinion" of the
Commission.

Is this opinion to be based upon hearsay, assumption,

prejudice or facts?

It would appear inconceivable that considering the

interests involved and all that has been said above that any decision
reached would be based upon anything but facts and/or relevant evidence

14
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Yel, nowhere in the record do such facts or evidence appear.

It is the

appellee's contention that no cause need be established, a fact that
appellant contends is in opposition to the cited sections of the ordinance
under the rules of otatutory construction.
The Utah case of Pehrson v. City Council of City of Ephraim,
(l896) 14 Utah l47, 46 P 657, which appears to be very much in point here,
involved an application for the issuance of a writ of certiorari to review
the action of defendant which revoked the plaintiff's license to sell liquors.
The action of the defendant had not been explained on the basis that Section
2 of the statute in question did not require cause to be shown.

The Court

disagreed saying that Sections land 2 of the statute in question were in
conflict; at page 658:
"The statute vests in such court and counsel a legal
discretion, which must be exercised on a reasonable
and not in a willful manner, and only for cause can a
license be withheld. Therefore, the action by which a
license is granted or withheld must be based upon
such relevant facts as may come before the body which
is called upon to act. ... Those who sit to administer
the law should administer it fairly. Where a thing is
to be done, for cause, in the exercise of discretion,
the law intends a sound discretion, and the action should
be based upon the merits of the case as shown by the
facts in relation to it."
A similar situation has arisen in the instant case.

Section

7-6-l requires notice and hearing and states that revocation must be based
upon some cause.

However, the trial court relied upon Section 7-6-2 to

15
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the effect that "· .. in no such case need any cause be given ... " to
justify its conclusions.

This appears to fall directly within the

reasonin~

of Pehrson and requires a factually substantiated cause as determined or
the merits.
In the instant case the only established fact presented to the
Commission was that Eldon L. Anderson had plead guilty to a felony
approximately 22 years prior.

The incident involved the theft of several

bales of hay by Mr. Anderson and two other persons when they were
approximately 18 years of age.

The Commission used this as part of its

findings in denying the application of Mr. Anderson.

This record was

expunged in Case No. 2832, Fourth District Court of Utah County. (R-oZ
page 3)
In Pennsylvania Distilling Co. v. Pennsylvania Alcohol Fermi'
Bd., (1933) 20 Pa. D&C 385, where the alcohol permit board refused a
liquor license on the grounds that the officers of the applicant corporatior
had admitted that they had been guilty of violations of the National Prohibition Act many years before the first license was granted, the Court he!c
that the licensing authority may not refuse the renewal of the license.
The Court pointed out that where a permit is issued and the licensee,
upon the strength of that permit, invests large sums of money in plant
and equipment, it would be almost intolerable to permit the licensing
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authorities Lo refuse subsequent permits, and the court determined that
the licensing authorities had abused their discretion.
Although it is recognized that a license to sell intoxicating
liquor is not property in any constitutional sense, it is contended that
because of the conditions under which such licenses are issued, a
liquor license can be said to have the quality of property with an actual
pecuniary value far in excess of the license fee executed.

It has been said

that a liquor license is a legal interest in the nature of an economic asset
created by statute; and because it has monetary value, it possesses the
qualities of property, 45 Am Jur 2d 569, "Intoxicating Liquors", Sec. ll7,
and it should not be disputed that one who has been granted a liquor license
invests money and labor in his business.
The above reasoning applies directly in this case because the
application in question is an application for a renewal.

Mr. Anderson

submitted his application on December 15, 1975; and he had already been
operating his business for several years and had invested large sums of
money into it.

The Utah County Commission did not act upon the request

until July 12, 1976; and il was during this period that Mr. Anderson
experienced unusual investigative pressure from the Utah County Sheriff's
Office.

The end result was a denial of Mr. Anderson's application

because, as stated by the appellees, his business was "not being operated
in a lawful manner."

To this dale the appellant has not been found guilty
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of violating any law.
In Pennsylvania the view has been taken with what app<>ars •,,
be common sense that administrative discretion in refusing the renewitl
of a liquor license is not so broad as in refusing an application made for
the first time.

Charles D. Karer Co. v. Doran, (1930) 42 FZd 923. In

Doran the Court said that in the case of an original permit, the judgmec'
of unfitness is prospective and involves a judgment as to the future cond'.'
whereas in renewal cases the judgment is retrospective and involves the
question of whether anything has been done or omitted which warrants a
finding of unfitness.

The Court also said that the fact that the applicanr

for a renewal has had a permit for many successive years is one of muc
significance, as property rights have grown up under a granted permit
and, consequently, no just administrator will refuse to renew it and socr·
troy the value of the investment unless the conduct of the permitee or
other sufficient reasons justify such refusal.
And in a case where the evidence for and against the necess
for licensing the petitioner's hotel was evenly divided, the fact that the
house had been licensed before was held to be prima facie evidence of'"
necessity and the license was granted.

Helling's License, (1886) 2 Pa.

Co 76.
Was the Utah County Commission's ruling in this case
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arbilrary and capricious?

There have been no complaints made by the

cilizenry of Utah County againsl the appellant.

The appellant's place of

business is not near any residence, and no citizen's complaints have been
filed against the Silver Dollar Lounge.

The only complaints on record are

l hose of the Ulah County Sheriff's Office as reflected in paragraphs 2 and
3 of lhe Commission's findings.

These complaints are simply allegations.

There have not been any convictions for the sale of beer lo minors, for
public nuisance or for dislurbance.

No actual witnesses have appeared

before the Commission, and no convictions againsl the appellant have been
put into evidence.

Because there are none, the allegations of the Utah

County Sheriff remain allegations since no prosecutions that could have
resulted in revocation of the license have been initiated.

If the Sheriff's

Office did indeed have complaints made to it concerning the appellant's
business, why were they not pursued?

The conclusion must be that it was

fell that such complainls were eilher unfounded or not considered serious
enough lo warrant proseculion.
Based upon the indicated lack of facts and evidence, the
Cornn1ission's action and method of denying the appellant a license were
both arbitrary and capricious and denied lhe appellant due process of law.
It is submitled that the respondents violated the rule of statutory construcI

ton in failing to follow the mandate of lhe cited ordinances.

Nowhere in the
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material before the Court is there adequate establishment of "cause"
justify the denial of the appellant's application for a new license.

10

What

does appear in the material before the Court is the clear indication that
the actions of the Cor,unission and the Sheriff's Office were an attempt
to close the Silver Dollar Lounge for the sole reason that Eldon L.
Anderson attempted to challenge the constitutionality of the Utah County
Sunday closing law as it related to the sale of beer.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Trial Court
should be reversed and the following relief granted:

1.

The denial of appellant's application for a Class B Beer

license should be held to have been an arbitrary and capricious decision.
and the Utah County Commission should be ordered to issue said licenst
to the appellant;
2.

In the alternative, this Court should remand the mattert'

the District Court with the direction that specific findings of fact and
conclusions of law be prepared by the Court;
3.

In the alternative, if this Court upholds the District

Court's ruling on the summary dismissal of appellant's petition, a
restraining order should issue directing Utah County to refrain from
interfering with the appellant's operation of the Silver Dollar Lounge
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until the second cause of action is heard on its merits.

Respectfully submitted,

MATT BILJANIC
Attorney for Ap llant
7355 South 9th East
Midvale, Utah 8404 7

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to Glenn Burningham, Deputy Utah County Attorney, 60 East
100 South, Provo, Utah, 84601, postage prepaid, this _ _ _ _ day of
- - - - - - - ' 19 7 8.

MATT BILJANic/
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